ab ovo

War and tariff costs reach the data: the August ledger

By 3 August 2026 the data releases of the preceding three weeks had registered, in sequence, the measurable costs of the year’s policy record. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported June consumer prices down 0.4 percent on the month — the largest one-month decline since April 2020 — but up 3.5 percent over the year, with the energy index up 15.7 percent over the same twelve months and core inflation at 2.6 percent.1 The Bureau of Economic Analysis reported second-quarter real GDP growth of 1.5 percent annualised, down from 2.1 percent, with the quarter’s core PCE price index rising 3.4 percent annualised.2 The Treasury’s June Monthly Treasury Statement showed gross customs duties of $23.6 billion against $49.2 billion in refunds paid — a net customs outflow of roughly $25.6 billion — and a June deficit of $120 billion, against a $27 billion surplus in June 2025.3 The Federal Open Market Committee held its target range at 3½ to 3¾ percent on 29 July over three dissents preferring a hike (see FOMC holds at 3½–3¾ percent over three dissents seeking a hike).4 At month-end the 10-year Treasury yield stood at 4.75 percent, up roughly 20 basis points over the back half of July; the Freddie Mac 30-year fixed mortgage averaged 6.66 percent, a fourth consecutive weekly rise; and Brent crude, which crossed $100 in late July, settled at $90.74 on 29 July after gaining roughly 24 percent for the month.567

  1. The war’s energy shock now traces end to end through the price data: the Strait of Hormuz disruption the International Energy Agency called the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil market (see FOMC June meeting: Warsh’s first as Chair)8 appears in the 15.7 percent twelve-month energy CPI rise, in a second quarter whose overall PCE price index rose 5.1 percent annualised, and in the FOMC’s own statement language attributing elevated inflation “in part” to “supply shocks that have driven price increases in certain sectors, including energy” — the mechanism the federal funds rate does not reach, and the stated ground of the July policy split.124 June’s headline relief came almost entirely from a 5.7 percent monthly energy decline recorded before the 8 July ceasefire collapse re-priced crude (see Two weeks after ceasefire collapse, Houthis embargo Saudi-bound shipping).17

  2. The Supreme Court’s February holding that IEEPA does not authorise tariffs (see Supreme Court holds IEEPA does not authorise tariffs) converted last year’s tariff revenue into this summer’s fiscal outflow: the refunds CBP certifies flow out through the permanent indefinite customs-refund appropriation (Treasury Account Symbol 20X1807), with interest accruing from the date of deposit under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c), and June’s $49.2 billion refund total exceeded the month’s gross collections while roughly $86.3 billion had been certified as of 10 July (see IEEPA refund certifications pass $86 billion; CIT orders Phase 3 reliquidation for suing importers).3910

  3. The tariff price floor under consumer goods did not lapse with § 122: the surcharge expired at its 150-day statutory ceiling on 24 July, and the presidential memorandum of 23 July directed a two-tier Section 301 forced-labour action at 10 and 12.5 percent across roughly 60 economies to succeed it, with trade-advisory coverage reporting no collection gap at the border and operative collection turning on USTR’s implementing instruments (see Section 301 forced-labour tariffs replace the § 122 surcharge); the import-cost pass-through documented at the border and at the store accordingly continues under a successor regime.1112 Affordability entered the legislative calendar the same week: House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries launched a “Fighting for an Affordable America” agenda on 27 July, and housing costs polled as the top issue for younger voters in a July CNBC survey.1314

  4. Two credit gauges diverge: the public high-yield market shows an option-adjusted spread of 2.84 percent as of 30 July — below its ten-year average — while the private credit market shows a record 6.0 percent default rate in April per Fitch Ratings, a public business-development- company index discount near 17 percent, the first-ever quarterly net outflow from non-traded BDCs in Q1, and a Moody’s caution that BDC loan marks “may exaggerate signs of private credit stress”; Moody’s separately estimated roughly $300 billion in US bank credit extended to private-credit funds, BDCs and CLOs.15161718 The divergence is a valuation-timing artifact of the private book — daily-priced public spreads clear continuously, while private marks adjust at reporting dates.17

  5. Four policy items with documented economic consequences remain open without enacted resolution. FY2027 appropriations: 59 days to the 1 October fiscal-year start, the House CR running to 4 December (see House passes FY2027 stopgap to 4 December; Senate rewrite expected) and the Senate Appropriations Committee’s own vehicle — running to 11 December, released 2 August (see Senate appropriators release CR to 11 December, blocking OMB grant rule) — remain unreconciled in a fiscal year that produced the longest full-scope funding lapse in U.S. history and a separate 76-day Department of Homeland Security lapse.19 FISA § 702: lapsed since June with no enacted revival vehicle (see FISA Section 702 expires after House rejects extension). Refunds for importers who have not sued: roughly $44 billion in collected duties not yet accepted for processing, with the government’s Federal Circuit appeal contesting relief for non-litigants pending (see IEEPA refund certifications pass $86 billion; CIT orders Phase 3 reliquidation for suing importers).10 Federal workforce capacity: the CDC’s loss of roughly 46 percent of its career Senior Executive Service since January 2025 under the Schedule Policy/Career framework, with no court ruling and no legislative response (see Schedule Policy/Career at seven weeks: amended complaint, dismissal motion pending, a transparency demand).20

Projected downstream effects

The following downstream effects are projections from the mechanisms above; each names the correlation between the reported event and the subsequent effect, and the observable indicator that would confirm or refute it within a stated time window.

July CPI reversal: June’s negative headline month rested on an energy decline that preceded the ceasefire collapse; with Brent up roughly 24 percent in July, the July CPI energy index is expected to reverse sign and push the headline monthly print back positive. The observable indicator is the BLS July CPI release in the second week of August — the same release window the corpus’s June metals analysis identified as the pass-through checkpoint (see Section 232 metals modifications: week-one downstream effects).17

FOMC dissent trajectory: the three dissents for a hike, recorded against a statement committing that “The Committee will deliver price stability,” should produce a documented account of the hawkish case in the meeting minutes; the observable indicators are the minutes release roughly three weeks after the 29 July meeting and the 15-16 September statement’s vote line.4

Customs net line stays negative: with CAPE Phase 3 reliquidation of suing importers’ finally liquidated entries ordered and § 1505(c) interest accruing, monthly refund outflows are expected to keep the customs net line negative into the autumn even as § 301 replacement collections begin accruing at 10 and 12.5 percent; the observable indicator is the July Monthly Treasury Statement’s customs and refund lines in mid-August.3109

Private-book convergence: the gap between benign public spreads and stressed private-credit marks is expected to close in one direction or the other as Q2 BDC filings post; the observable indicators are Q2 10-Q net-asset-value marks and non-traded BDC flow data through September.1715

Outcome audit

  • 2026-08-25: The “July CPI reversal” projection was scored on its two sub-claims against the BLS release of 12 August 2026. The headline sub-claim held — CPI-U rose 0.1 percent on the month after falling 0.4 percent in June. The energy sub-claim did not: the energy index fell 1.5 percent in July and gasoline fell 2.9 percent, so the energy index did not reverse sign. The headline turned positive on shelter, which rose 0.1 percent and accounted for roughly two-thirds of the monthly all-items increase. The projection reasoned from the July move in Brent to the July CPI energy index without accounting for the lag in refined-product pass-through. The +0.1 percent headline also matched the consensus forecast recorded before the release, so the reversal was already anticipated.21 The “FOMC dissent trajectory” projection was confirmed on its first indicator by the minutes released 19 August, and on its second on 16 September: the Committee raised the target range by a quarter point 12–0, adopting the position its three July dissenters had taken. That is the hawkish case documented by being carried rather than by persisting as dissent, which is a stronger outcome than the wording above anticipated and a different one — nothing here predicted unanimity.22 The “customs net line stays negative” projection was confirmed for July: the Monthly Treasury Statement records net customs duties of −$8,546 million for the month, though the outflow narrowed from roughly −$25.6 billion in June.23 It did not hold past its own window. The August statement, released 15 September, records net customs duties of +$12,836 million, the first positive month since April; the score stands because the indicator named above was the July statement, but the sentence’s “into the autumn” reached past the test chosen for it.24 The “private-book convergence” projection remains open; its window closes 30 September.

Corrections

  • 2026-09-24: The post placed the 150-day limit on § 122 surcharges at 19 U.S.C. § 2132(b) and described an extension by joint resolution under § 2132(d). The 15 percent cap, the 150-day limit and extension “by Act of Congress” are all in § 2132(a); § 2132(b) is the national-interest exception and § 2132(d) concerns nondiscriminatory treatment.11

Footnotes

  1. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index — June 2026,” USDL-26-1191, 14 July 2026 (all items −0.4 percent in June, seasonally adjusted, the largest one-month decrease since April 2020; +3.5 percent over the 12 months, not seasonally adjusted; core +2.6 percent over 12 months and unchanged on the month; energy −5.7 percent on the month and +15.7 percent over 12 months; food +3.0 percent over 12 months). https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cpi_07142026.htm 2 3 4

  2. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Gross Domestic Product, 2nd Quarter 2026 (Advance Estimate),” 30 July 2026 (real GDP +1.5 percent annualised after +2.1 percent in Q1; gross domestic purchases price index +5.7 percent; PCE price index +5.1 percent; core PCE +3.4 percent). https://www.bea.gov/news/2026/gdp-advance-estimate-2nd-quarter-2026 2

  3. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Monthly Treasury Statement, June 2026 (gross customs duties $23.6 billion; $49.2 billion in customs refunds paid; June deficit $120 billion against a $27 billion June 2025 surplus; nine-month FY2026 deficit $1.367 trillion) https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/static-data/published-reports/mts/MonthlyTreasuryStatement_202606.pdf; Congressional Budget Office, Monthly Budget Review: June 2026, July 2026. https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2026-07/61982-MBR.pdf 2 3

  4. Federal Open Market Committee, statement of 29 July 2026 (target range maintained at 3-1/2 to 3-3/4 percent by a 9-3 vote; dissents by Beth M. Hammack, Neel Kashkari and Lorie K. Logan preferring a 1/4-point increase; “supply shocks that have driven price increases in certain sectors, including energy”; “The Committee will deliver price stability”). https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260729a.htm 2 3

  5. Advisor Perspectives, “Treasury Yields Snapshot: July 31, 2026” (10-year at 4.75 percent and 2-year at 4.28 percent at month-end; 10-year at 4.55 percent on 17 July). https://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/2026/07/31/treasury-yields-snapshot-july-31-2026

  6. Freddie Mac, Primary Mortgage Market Survey, week of 30 July 2026 (30-year fixed averaged 6.66 percent, up from 6.58 percent, the fourth consecutive weekly increase). https://www.freddiemac.com/pmms

  7. CNBC, “Oil prices slide as Iran reportedly may halt attacks,” 27 July 2026 (Brent −8.7 percent to $88.36; WTI −7.5 percent to $82.61) https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/27/oil-price-wti-brent-slide-as-iran-reportedly-may-halt-attacks.html; CNBC, 29 July 2026 (Brent +7.9 percent to $90.74; WTI +6.6 percent to $84.46; Brent crossing $100 in late July; roughly 24 percent monthly gain). https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/29/oil-prices-today-brent-wti-iran-us-hormuz.html 2 3

  8. International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report, March 2026 (the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil market). https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-march-2026

  9. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) (interest on customs refunds from the date of deposit); customs refunds disburse through the permanent indefinite refund appropriation, Treasury Account Symbol 20X1807 (“Refund of Receipts, Customs”). https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title19-section1505&edition=prelim 2

  10. CBP status declaration of 13 July 2026 ($86.3 billion certified and sent to Treasury; $121.75 billion accepted for processing against approximately $166 billion collected); Freestyle World, Inc. v. United States orders of 15 and 17 July 2026. See IEEPA refund certifications pass $86 billion; CIT orders Phase 3 reliquidation for suing importers. 2 3

  11. Proclamation 11012’s § 122 surcharge expired by operation of law at 12:01 a.m. EDT 24 July 2026 under the 150-day limit of 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a). See Section 122 10% surcharge replaces IEEPA tariffs and Section 301 forced-labour tariffs replace the § 122 surcharge. 2

  12. Cavallo, Gopinath, Neiman, Tang, “Tariff Pass-Through at the Border and at the Store,” AEA Papers and Proceedings 111 (2021) (documenting near-complete pass-through of tariff costs to US import prices at the border and partial pass-through at retail). https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pandp.20211013

  13. Al Jazeera, “Hakeem Jeffries puts affordability at centre of Democrats’ midterm campaign,” 27 July 2026 (“Fighting for an Affordable America” agenda). https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/7/27/hakeem-jeffries-puts-affordability-at-centre-of-democrats-midterm-campaign

  14. CNBC, “Housing costs are the top election issue for young voters, CNBC survey finds,” 19 July 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/19/housing-costs-election-young-voters-cnbc-survey-finds.html

  15. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), ICE BofA US High Yield Index Option-Adjusted Spread (BAMLH0A0HYM2), observation of 30 July 2026 at 2.84 percent, below the series’ ten-year average. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 2

  16. Fitch Ratings’ US private-credit default rate at a record 6.0 percent in April 2026, and the Proskauer Private Credit Default Index at 2.73 percent in Q1 2026 (697 loans, $189.2 billion), as reported by Forbes, “Rising Private Credit Defaults Are Testing Banks And Insurers,” 24 May 2026. https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2026/05/24/rising-private-credit-defaults-are-testing-banks-and-insurers/

  17. PIMCO, “The Credit Market Lens: What BDC Redemptions and NAV Pressures Mean for Investors” (public BDC index discount near 17 percent, matching the June 2022 low; first-ever non-traded BDC quarterly net outflow in Q1 2026; convergence expected through NAV markdowns, wider secondary discounts or realised losses). PIMCO is an asset manager with positions in the markets it analyses. https://www.pimco.com/eu/en/insights/the-credit-market-lens-what-bdc-redemptions-and-nav-pressures-mean-for-investors 2 3

  18. Moody’s commentary of 5 June 2026 (BDC loan marks “may exaggerate signs of private credit stress”), via Alternative Credit Investor https://alternativecreditinvestor.com/2026/06/05/moodys-bdc-loan-marks-may-exaggerate-signs-of-private-credit-stress/; Moody’s estimate of roughly $300 billion in US bank credit extended to private-credit funds, BDCs and CLOs. https://www.moodys.com/web/en/us/insights/credit-risk/private-credit/us-corporate-default-risk-in-2026.html

  19. Senate Committee on Appropriations, “Sen. Collins Statement on Release of Continuing Resolution,” 2 August 2026 (Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2027; “continues current government funding levels until December 11th”). See Longest shutdown in US history ends and DHS shutdown ends after 76 days. https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news/majority/sen-collins-statement-on-release-of-continuing-resolution

  20. Federal News Network reporting of 6 July 2026 (CDC’s loss of approximately 46 percent of its career Senior Executive Service since January 2025). See Schedule Policy/Career at seven weeks: amended complaint, dismissal motion pending, a transparency demand.

  21. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index — July 2026,” USDL-26-1378, released 12 August 2026 (CPI-U +0.1 percent in July, seasonally adjusted, after −0.4 percent in June; energy index −1.5 percent on the month; gasoline −2.9 percent; shelter +0.1 percent, “accounting for roughly two-thirds of the monthly all items increase”; +3.4 percent over the 12 months). Consensus forecast of +0.1 percent for CPI m/m as recorded by Forex Factory’s economic calendar before the release (aggregator; consensus figures vary between providers). https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm

  22. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement,” 16 September 2026: “The Federal Open Market Committee approved the following statement for release by a 12 – 0 vote,” raising the target range “by 1/4 percentage point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent.” See The three dissenters win, and the vote goes 12-0. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm

  23. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Monthly Treasury Statement, July 2026, Table 9 (Summary of Receipts by Source, and Outlays by Function, July 2026 and Other Periods; $ millions): Customs Duties −8,546 for the month, 154,473 fiscal year to date against 135,688 for the comparable prior period. https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/static-data/published-reports/mts/MonthlyTreasuryStatement_202607.pdf

  24. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Monthly Treasury Statement, August 2026, Table 4 ($ millions as printed): Customs Duties, current month gross 23,377, refunds 10,541, net 12,836. See The customs line turns positive as refunds collapse. https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/static-data/published-reports/mts/MonthlyTreasuryStatement_202608.pdf