Supreme Court holds IEEPA does not authorise tariffs

On 20 February 2026 the U.S. Supreme Court held 6-3 in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (No. 24-1287), consolidated with Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. (No. 25-250), that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorise the President to impose tariffs.¹ Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson; Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Alito and Kavanaugh.¹ The question presented was whether IEEPA’s grant at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) to “regulate … importation … of … any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest” authorises the imposition of tariffs.²³ The cases reached the Court on cert to the Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (V.O.S. Selections) and on Rule 11 cert before judgment from the D.C. Circuit (Learning Resources), argued together on 5 November 2025.⁴ The decision affirms the Federal Circuit’s 7-4 en banc ruling of 29 August 2025 (Lourie, J., for the court; Taranto, Moore, Prost and Chen, JJ., dissenting).⁵

1. The Court grounds its holding in textual interpretation of the “regulate … importation” verb at § 1702(a)(1)(B), the constitutional allocation of the taxing power to Congress under Article I, § 8, cl. 1, the foundational tariff- delegation precedent of Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), and the major-questions doctrine articulated in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 U.S. 697 (2022); statutory deference is governed by Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).⁶⁷⁸ The nondelegation strand of the majority’s reasoning is anchored to Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), and addressed in a concurrence; the Thomas dissent argues that “regulate … importation” encompasses tariff adjustments as a historical matter.⁹

2. The decision invalidates the IEEPA tariff arc, including Executive Orders 14193 (Canada fentanyl), 14194 (Mexico fentanyl), 14195 (China fentanyl), 14256 (de minimis withdrawal), 14257 (reciprocal), 14266 (China escalation), 14289 (anti-stacking precedence), and the successor amending orders 14298, 14316, 14323, 14326, 14345 and 14346; secondary-tariff orders EO 14245 (Venezuela) and EO 14380 (Cuba) rest on the same § 1702(a)(1)(B) hook and fall on the same theory.¹⁰ Importer refunds for duties already collected proceed under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (protests against decisions of the Customs Service), § 1520 (refunds and errors) and § 1505(c) (interest on refunds), subject to the universal-injunction limits of Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025).¹¹¹²

3. The decision leaves intact other tariff statutes — § 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (requiring a Commerce Department national-security investigation under § 1862(b)(3)(A)); § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (requiring a USTR investigation under § 2414(a)(2)); and § 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2132 (balance-of-payments authority capped at 15% and limited to 150 days absent extension by Act of Congress, both under § 2132(a)) — which contain their own procedural and substantive predicates.¹³¹⁴¹⁵ Pre-existing § 232 duties on steel, aluminum and autos and § 301 duties on Chinese goods are outside the decision’s scope and continue to be collected.

Corrections

• 2026-09-24: The post placed the 150-day limit on § 122 surcharges at 19 U.S.C. § 2132(b) and described an extension by joint resolution under § 2132(d). The 15 percent cap, the 150-day limit and extension “by Act of Congress” are all in § 2132(a); § 2132(b) is the national-interest exception and § 2132(d) concerns nondiscriminatory treatment.¹⁵