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US strikes Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan

22 June 2025 · written 8 June 2026

President Donald J. Trump announced from the White House at approximately 10:00 p.m. EDT on 21 June 2025 that the United States had carried out Operation Midnight Hammer against three Iranian nuclear sites: the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. The strikes occurred at approximately 2:10 a.m. Iran local time on 22 June 2025.12 In a 22 June 2025 Pentagon briefing, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Dan Caine said seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers from the 509th Bomb Wing delivered 14 GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrators against Fordow, while a U.S. Navy guided-missile submarine fired more than two dozen Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles against surface targets at Natanz and Isfahan; the full strike package comprised approximately 125 U.S. aircraft (including refuelling tankers and fighter escorts) and a deception package of B-2 aircraft flown east as a feint. Caine called it “the largest operational B-2 strike in U.S. history” and said final battle damage assessment “will take some time.”2 The strikes followed Israeli air operations against Iran that began on 13 June 2025 (Operation Rising Lion).3 Senators Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) demanded congressional consultation; Sen. Kaine introduced S. J. Res. 59 (a War Powers resolution) on 22 June 2025.4

  1. The Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40 (2001), authorises force against those “responsible for” the 11 September 2001 attacks; the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. 107-243, authorises force in Iraq. Neither names Iran, and the White House has not invoked either as a basis for the strikes — the public rationale rests on Article II commander-in-chief authority.561 Under Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), unilateral presidential action without congressional authorisation sits in “the third category” where “his power is at its lowest ebb.”7 The War Powers Resolution requires the President to submit a report to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate within 48 hours where U.S. armed forces are introduced “into hostilities” — 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).8

  2. Iran enriched uranium to 60 per cent U-235 as reported by IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi (well above the 3.67 per cent ceiling of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), and on 12 June 2025 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution finding Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations.910 Iran is a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Article III safeguards); its safeguards obligations are codified in INFCIRC/214 (Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement).1112 Damage to safeguarded materials triggers reporting and inspection obligations under that agreement.

  3. Bases at Al Udeid (Qatar; U.S. Central Command forward headquarters and host to approximately 10,000 U.S. service members), Al Asad (Iraq), and in Bahrain and the UAE host the largest U.S. troop concentrations within Iranian ballistic-missile range. CENTCOM and the Air Force have reinforced air-defence postures in theatre.1314

Footnotes

  1. White House, “Address by President Donald J. Trump on Operation Midnight Hammer,” 21 June 2025 (~10:00 p.m. EDT). The White House page for this document is no longer retrievable: the month-index URL cited here returns 404, the item does not appear in whitehouse.gov search, and the Wayback Machine could not be reached on 17 September 2026 (HTTP 429 throughout). The link is removed rather than redirected to a section index, which is what made it unverifiable in the first place. Tracked at debt whitehouse-june-2025-readouts. ↩ ↩2

  2. U.S. Department of Defense, Pentagon press briefing on Operation Midnight Hammer by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Dan Caine, 22 June 2025. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/ ↩ ↩2

  3. Israel Defense Forces, statements on Operation Rising Lion against Iran, beginning 13 June 2025. ↩

  4. S. J. Res. 59, 119th Congress, introduced by Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.), 22 June 2025 (War Powers resolution on US use of force against Iran). https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/59 ↩

  5. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf ↩

  6. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498. https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ243/PLAW-107publ243.pdf ↩

  7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep343/usrep343579/usrep343579.pdf ↩

  8. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (48-hour Presidential report to Congress on introduction of armed forces into hostilities). https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section1543&edition=prelim ↩

  9. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, reports on Iran’s uranium enrichment to 60 per cent U-235, May-June 2025. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements ↩

  10. IAEA Board of Governors, resolution finding Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, 12 June 2025. https://www.iaea.org/about/policy/board-of-governors ↩

  11. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 1 July 1968, entered into force 5 March 1970; registered in the United Nations Treaty Series at vol. 729, No. I-10485. Article III(1) provides that “[e]ach non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty.” Cited to the UN Treaty Series rather than to the IAEA’s circulation of the same text at INFCIRC/140, which refuses automated requests. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20729/volume-729-i-10485-english.pdf ↩

  12. Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/214, 13 December 1974 — “The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” — which “entered into force on 15 May 1974, pursuant to Article 25.” Article 1 provides that “[t]he Government of Iran undertakes, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty, to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1974/infcirc214.pdf ↩

  13. U.S. Central Command Posture Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, FY2026. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings ↩

  14. U.S. Air Forces Central, public statements on regional air-defence reinforcement, June 2025. ↩

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