Executive order authorises Cuba-linked secondary tariffs

On 29 January 2026 President Trump signed Executive Order 14380, “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba,” authorising the imposition of tariffs on imports of goods that are products of any foreign country that “directly or indirectly, sells or otherwise provides oil to the Government of Cuba”; the order takes effect at 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on 30 January 2026.¹ The order declares a new national emergency under § 1701 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National Emergencies Act, invoking the President’s authorities under IEEPA, the NEA, and 3 U.S.C. § 301; it is structurally separate from the 14 September 1996 Cuba national emergency and from the embargo backbone of the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD) Act.²³⁴ The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and other heads of departments, is authorised to identify covered countries and recommend the additional ad valorem rate; the Secretary of the Treasury implements through OFAC and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.¹

1. The order operates as a secondary-sanctions instrument, targeting third-country conduct (supplying oil to Cuba) rather than direct U.S.-Cuba trade, which is restricted under the long-standing embargo at 31 C.F.R. Part 515 and its underlying statutes.⁴ The directly relevant precedent is Executive Order 14245 of 24 March 2025, which imposed a 25 percent ad valorem secondary tariff on imports from countries purchasing Venezuelan oil; the principal third-country oil supplier to Cuba is Mexico, with Venezuela and Russia also implicated under established supply arrangements.⁵⁶

2. The order’s tariff authority rests on the “regulate … importation” verb at IEEPA § 1702(a)(1)(B), 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) — the same statutory hook before the Supreme Court in Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. (No. 25-250) and Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (No. 24-1287), argued 5 November 2025 with a decision expected by the end of October Term 2025 in late June 2026.⁷⁸ A holding that IEEPA does not authorise tariffs would reach Cuba-linked secondary tariffs on the same theory as the reciprocal and fentanyl-trafficking tariff orders.

3. The order is a framework instrument: no HTSUS Chapter 99 subchapter III subheading has been assigned, no U.S. Customs and Border Protection Cargo Systems Messaging Service bulletin or CBP Federal Register implementing notice had been issued at the dateline, and the order does not on its face withdraw the 19 U.S.C. § 1321 de minimis treatment for low-value shipments.⁹ Operative duties attach only after State/Commerce country-designation, an HTSUS subheading assignment, and the CBP implementing chain are in place.