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EO 14326 sets country-specific reciprocal tariff rates

On 31 July 2025 President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order 14326, “Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates to Reflect Trading Partner Engagement and Modifying Status of Certain Reciprocal Tariff Rates,” modifying the schedule of country-specific reciprocal tariff rates under Executive Order 14257 of 2 April 2025, as amended by Executive Order 14266 of 9 April 2025 (90-day pause) and Executive Order 14316 of 7 July 2025 (extension to 1 August 2025).1234 The order retains the 10 per cent reciprocal baseline tariff in force since 12:01 a.m. EDT on 5 April 2025 and establishes country-specific rates enumerated in Annex I for approximately 70 trading partners, with the new rates taking effect at 12:01 a.m. EDT on 7 August 2025.1 Among the politically salient rates: the European Union and Japan at 15 per cent (under joint statements of 27 July 2025 and 22 July 2025 respectively); the Republic of Korea at 15 per cent (under a 30 July 2025 framework); the United Kingdom at 10 per cent (under the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal of 8 May 2025); India at 25 per cent; Switzerland at 39 per cent; and Canada at 35 per cent (under the separate IEEPA fentanyl track, not the reciprocal regime). Brazil at 50 per cent flows from Executive Order 14323 of 30 July 2025, a separate IEEPA action, not Annex I of EO 14326.56789 EO 14326 invokes IEEPA (50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.), § 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2483) and 3 U.S.C. § 301.101112 Country letters posted by the President on Truth Social in waves between 7 and 31 July 2025 had previewed the rates.13 V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, No. 25-1812 (Fed. Cir.), heard the underlying IEEPA-authority question on expedited en banc oral argument 31 July 2025 (the same day as EO 14326’s signing); the Court of International Trade had ruled on 28 May 2025 (Slip Op. 25-66) that IEEPA does not authorise these tariffs, a holding then under appeal subject to the Federal Circuit’s 29 May 2025 administrative stay.1415

  1. The 12:01 a.m. EDT effective time on 7 August 2025 is the entry-summary trigger at U.S. Customs and Border Protection; in-transit cargo loaded on a vessel at the port of loading before the effective date and entered for consumption before a separately specified later date are carved in at the prior rate.16 CBP collects the country-specific duty under HTSUS Chapter 99 subchapter III subheadings created or activated by Annex III of the order.17

  2. The merits question under the IEEPA “regulate … importation” verb at 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) sits with the Federal Circuit on expedited en banc review. If the Federal Circuit affirms the CIT’s 28 May 2025 holding that IEEPA does not authorise these tariffs, the rate schedule loses its statutory predicate; importer refund procedures would proceed under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (protests) and 19 U.S.C. § 1520 (refunds), conditioned on the scope of the equitable remedy ultimately ordered and on Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025).1819

  3. The reciprocal duties cumulate with other tariff regimes not covered by EO 14289’s anti-stacking precedence — the § 301 China duties, EO 14195 China IEEPA fentanyl, and MFN column-1 rates all apply on covered Chinese-origin goods alongside the reciprocal component. EO 14289 establishes precedence only among Section 232 auto/parts, EO 14193 / EO 14194, and Section 232 steel and aluminum.20

Footnotes

  1. Executive Order 14326, “Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates to Reflect Trading Partner Engagement and Modifying Status of Certain Reciprocal Tariff Rates,” 90 Fed. Reg. ___ (Aug. 2025) (signed 31 July 2025; rates effective 12:01 a.m. EDT on 7 August 2025). 2

  2. Executive Order 14257, “Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits,” 90 Fed. Reg. 15041 (Apr. 7, 2025) (FR Doc. 2025-06063). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/07/2025-06063/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and

  3. Executive Order 14266, “Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Trading Partner Retaliation and Alignment,” 90 Fed. Reg. 15625 (Apr. 15, 2025) (FR Doc. 2025-06462). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/15/2025-06462/modifying-reciprocal-tariff-rates-to-reflect-trading-partner-retaliation-and-alignment

  4. Executive Order 14316, “Extending the Modification of the Reciprocal Tariff Rates,” 90 Fed. Reg. ___ (July 2025) (signed 7 July 2025).

  5. European Commission and U.S. Government, Joint Statement on US-EU trade framework, 27 July 2025 (EU reciprocal-tariff rate at 15 per cent).

  6. U.S.-Japan framework on reciprocal tariffs, 22 July 2025 (Japan reciprocal-tariff rate at 15 per cent).

  7. U.S.-Republic of Korea framework on reciprocal tariffs, 30 July 2025 (Korea reciprocal-tariff rate at 15 per cent).

  8. General Terms for the U.S.-U.K. Economic Prosperity Deal, 8 May 2025 (UK reciprocal-tariff baseline at 10 per cent).

  9. Executive Order 14323, IEEPA action on Brazil, signed 30 July 2025 (separate IEEPA emergency action; Brazil rate at 50 per cent; not part of EO 14326 Annex I).

  10. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section1702&edition=prelim

  11. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section1621&edition=prelim

  12. § 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2483. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title19-section2483&edition=prelim

  13. @realDonaldTrump, Truth Social posts of 7-31 July 2025 (sequential country letters to foreign leaders announcing country-specific reciprocal-tariff rates). https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump

  14. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, Slip Op. 25-66 (Ct. Int’l Trade May 28, 2025) (Katzmann, Reif and Restani, JJ., holding that IEEPA does not authorise the reciprocal tariffs). https://www.cit.uscourts.gov/sites/cit/files/25-66.pdf

  15. Order granting administrative stay, V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, No. 25-1812 (Fed. Cir. May 29, 2025) (per curiam); en banc oral argument 31 July 2025.

  16. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CSMS guidance on EO 14326 implementation (in-transit carve-out conditions for goods loaded on a vessel at the port of loading before 7 August 2025).

  17. Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, Chapter 99 subchapter III (Annex III to EO 14326 enumerates the operative subheadings on which CBP collects). https://hts.usitc.gov/current

  18. 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (protests against decisions of the Customs Service); 19 U.S.C. § 1520 (refunds and errors). https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title19-section1514&edition=prelim

  19. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025) (universal-injunction scope). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a884_8n59.pdf

  20. Executive Order 14289, “Addressing Certain Tariffs on Imported Articles,” 90 Fed. Reg. 18907 (May 2, 2025) (FR Doc. 2025-07835). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/02/2025-07835/addressing-certain-tariffs-on-imported-articles